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M. MOORE

1. Introduction
1.1. Institutional law reform in Canada
This article considers the past, present and future of institutional law reform
in Canada. Through the time of this writing, that narrative is broadly of two
diﬀerent paths, corresponding to the country’s two oﬃcial legal systems, the
civil law of Québec private law, and the common law in the rest of Canada.
This article respects that duality in how the structure of each section is
divided so as to be able to follow over time the law reform trails that have
woven their way through both Canadian civil law and Canadian common law.
More precisely, the course of the article proceeds as follows. I commence
with a brief historical introduction in order to provide background and
context to the succeeding narrative. Then, in Section 2, the article surveys signiﬁcant instances of institutional law reform in Canada that have since terminated or are no longer in existence. Both the civil law and common law
portion of that survey conclude with reﬂections on notable patterns evident
within them that may be relevant to the present and future of law reform
in Canada. Section 3 provides an overview of the current landscape of institutional law reform in Canada. This broad overview includes not only law
reform institutions directly tied to civil law or common law jurisdictions in
Canada, but also associations of law reform institutions, and various other
types of organisation that are active in the Canadian law reform arena. The
section considers the roles, capabilities and limitations of each, from the perspective of the law reform endeavour.
In Section 4, the article turns to contemplation of the future of law reform
in Canada, with the necessary caution that such extrapolation calls for. Given
the frequent closure by governments of law reform commissions in Canada,
the limitations that others operate under, and the recurring suggestion by
critics that they are superﬂuous, the section begins by querying whether the
story of law reform in Canada to date contraindicates any ongoing need for
its pursuit in an independent, dedicated, institutional form. Concluding
that the story does seem to support a continued and indeed renewed commitment, the article next ponders the perhaps unparalleled diversity of incarnations and approaches to modern institutional law reform that have been seen
in Canada, in order to pose the question of what choices of objective, structure
and method may prove most fruitful in future eﬀorts. Whilst a comprehensive
answer to that question is well beyond the scope here, the patterns previously
highlighted within the sections on the past and present of institutional law
reform in Canada constitute key challenges, and hence provide seemingly
solid ground from which to at least elicit some preliminary and tentative
inferences about the path institutional law reform in Canada might pursue
in the future. Although some of these suggestions represent a departure
from the models dominant in the narrative thus far, in each case the Canadian
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experience itself (and in some cases, foreign models) conﬁrm the presence of
some already existing evidence of promising results of experimentation relatable to the suggestions. The prospects of a more stable, central and consistent
role for institutional law reform in Canada in the future ultimately depend on
how stakeholders recognise and respond to the reasons underlying both the
tremendous successes and failures of Canadian law reform until now.
It may be queried what, for purposes here, is meant by ‘law reform’.
Deﬁnitions have been given by two late leaders of law reform in Canada:
William Hurlburt, the force behind the Alberta Law Reform Institute,
author of the original text on the history of law reform, and a common law
practitioner by background, deﬁned it as ‘the application of skills, experience,
consultation, and invention to devise a reordering of law, institutions or
practices so that they will have greater social utility’.1 Meanwhile, Roderick
Macdonald, founding president of the Law Commission of Canada, internationally pre-eminent scholar of law reform, and a professor from McGill University’s dual civil law and common law programme, deﬁned it as
‘reconceiving law to ensure that it is responsive, equally accessible, and
just’.2 I myself avoid particular deﬁnition, and rely rather on common understandings, which I would broadly describe as any improvement in the law as it
impacts society (directly or indirectly).
It may also be wondered what scope is entailed in using the preﬁx institutional law reform. By this, I refer to established organisational pursuit of
the object of law reform; the central organs of government are excluded.
The organisation may be permanent or be for a limited time or purpose. It
is immaterial whether all, some or none of the words ‘law’, ‘reform’ or ‘commission’ are used in the oﬃcial name of the organisation.
With that said, I next turn to a brief survey of the history of institutional
law reform in Canada.

1.2. History
1.2.1. Civil law
The history of institutionalised law reform within Québec’s civil law tradition
can be traced to France’s Code Napoléon. As in other jurisdictions worldwide,
the Code Napoléon provided Québec jurists a model, both of result in realising ambitious law reform, and of process in achieving it after a succession of
failed eﬀorts during the Revolution until then and indeed centuries of vain
aspirations.3 To law reformers today, broadly familiar elements are
William Hurlburt, ‘The Origins and Nature of Law Reform Commissions in the Canadian Provinces: A Reply
to Recommissioning Law Reform by Professor RA MacDonald’ (1996) 35 Alberta Law Review 880, 893.
2
Roderick MacDonald, ‘Law Reform for Dummies (3rd Edition)’ (2014) 51(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 859,
885.
3
Charles Lobingier, ‘Napoleon and His Code’ (1918) 32(2) Harvard Law Review 114, 115–26.
1
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discernible: a commission of outside experts was appointed, dedicated to the
reform. The commission had representative aspects, in terms realistic for that
era (judges and practitioners; varied expertise spanning the diverse legal
sources; and distinct social backgrounds, political sympathies and perspectives on law). There were consultative requirements (judiciary, legislative
committee of the Council of State, full Council of State, besides the Tribunate
and the Legislature from which it needed approval). From draft reforms
through to implementation, crucial were extensive consultations with the
executive.4 In those, Napoleon, who often presided, was noted for his
inﬂuence—not only on substantive reforms, summarised by Herbert Fisher
as focused on ‘civil equality, healthy family life, secure bulwarks to property,
religious toleration, a government raised above the howls of faction. This is
the policy which he stamped upon the Civil Code’5—but also in pushing
for the formal traits of clarity and accessibility.6 To colleagues, Napoleon’s
contribution was surprising, given his lack of legal training; for a law reformer
today, accustomed to negotiating support by the executive or other key nonexpert stakeholders, it might be expected.
Around 60 years later in Canada East (now Québec), a similar type of
project took shape: the Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC). Though sometimes cast as not about reform but politics—viz. entrenching the institutional
traditions of French Canada before Confederation with British North
America (1867), an eﬀect it had and meaning it held to nationalists of later
generations—careful analysis of the project’s genesis by Professor John Brierley concludes that this was not (and by the timeline, could not be) its main
purpose.7 Yet it is also true that the type of reform pursued by the CCLC
codiﬁcation was not what modern law reformers call ‘social law reform’, as
was more prominent in the 1955–91 recodiﬁcation that produced the Civil
Code of Québec (CCQ).8 As Brierley wrote, ‘memory was certainly more
important than imagination in the codiﬁcation of 1866’.9 The primary objective was a technical class of law reforms, for which codiﬁcation had proven a
successful model,10 including the Code Napoléon and the Civil Code of
Louisiana (1825)—both expressly invoked in the Act creating the Lower
Canada codiﬁcation commission.11 These reforms included consolidation,

4

ibid 117–26.
H.A.L. Fisher, 9 Cambridge Modern History 151, 164.
Lobingier (n3) 131–32.
7
John Brierley, ‘Québec’s Civil Law Codiﬁcation Viewed and Reviewed’ (1968) 14(4) McGill Law Journal 522,
526–42.
8
ibid 529.
9
John Brierley, ‘The Renewal of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: The New Civil Code of Québec’ (1992) 42
(4) University of Toronto Law Journal 484, 501.
10
Brierley, CCLC (n7) 533–41.
11
An Act to provide for the Codiﬁcation of the Laws of Lower Canada relative to Civil matters and Procedure, 20 Vict, SC 1857, c43.
5
6
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restatement, systematisation and accessibility.12 The codiﬁcation process generally followed the established mode, but adjusted for the Province’s own situation and means at that time; it also operated with greater independence and
less consultation than in France.13 Consultation played an expanded role in
the later CCQ recodiﬁcation—the Province’s signature law reform of the
modern period.14
Procedural law was also reformed via codiﬁcations, ﬁrst in 1867, and at
intervals since, using the familiar mode of project-commissions of outside
experts doing the heavy lifting, followed by reﬁnement through government
consultations. The centrality of codes in Québec civil law shaped a distinct
reform pattern: comprehensive reform, followed by relative doctrinal stability
but non-Code legislative proliferation, until recodiﬁcation. Since the codes
fulﬁl the role of systematically ordering the body of law, arguments for a permanent law reform institution in Québec have rested more on the need to
maintain the codal reform oeuvres, by continuously updating code provisions
as deﬁciencies emerge or social changes require.15 To date, a standing law
reform commission has not been established in Canadian civil law.

1.2.2. Common law
In common law Canada, it has been said that the country ‘has a rich and long,
but also somewhat troubling, experience with law reform commissions’.16 We
shall see why this is so.
Reform origins are traced to ad hoc eﬀorts, apparently going back centuries, to reform the laws of England, ‘sometimes with some success’, as with
the Common Law Procedures Act and Judicature Acts, and ‘sometimes
with none’.17 According to Hurlburt, such eﬀorts had in common that they
were instituted for limited purposes and/or time.18 In the U.S., the
inﬂuence of Max Weber and of American legal modernists such as Roscoe
Pound and Benjamin Cardozo helped fuel the creation of standing law
reform agencies, beginning in 1925 with New Jersey, even contemplating
potential codiﬁcation.19 Other states followed; however, neither this U.S.
trend nor that from civilian jurisdictions including Québec directly caught
12

Brierley, CCLC (n7) 533–41.
ibid.
14
Brierley, CCQ (n9).
15
Brierley, CCLC (n7) 573; Madeleine Cantin-Cumyn, ‘Les innovations du Code civil du Québec: un premier
bilan’ (2005) 46(1–2) Cahiers de droit 463, 479.
16
Yves LeBouthillier, ‘The Former Law Commission of Canada: The Road Less Travelled’ in Matthew Dyson,
James Lee and Shona Wilson Stark (eds.), Fifty Years of the Law Commissions: The Dynamics of Law Reform
(Bloomsbury 2016), 97.
17
Hurlburt, Reply (n1) 885.
18
William Hurlburt, Law Reform Commissions in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Juriliber 1986),
36.
19
Gavin Murphy, Law Reform Agencies (International Cooperation Group 2004), 4, 82–83; Roderick Macdonald, ‘Recommissioning Law Reform’ (1996) 35 Alberta Law Review 831, 835.
13
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on in common law Canada.20 In 1934, England created a Law Revision Committee, and Ontario followed suit in 1941.21 Interrupted by World War II,
these were later re-established: in England, as the Law Reform Committee
in 1952, and in Ontario again in 1956.22 Other Canadian provinces did so
as well: Nova Scotia (1954); Saskatchewan (1958); Manitoba (1962); Alberta
(1964).23 These early eﬀorts tended to consist of volunteer committees with
limited resources and without independence; their work was largely
conﬁned to patchwork issues of ‘lawyer’s law’.24 Regarding intellectual currents, Macdonald explains how developing better law reform institutions
was hampered by how, ‘from the late 1920s until well into the 1950s … the
prevailing critical ethic in law was one of resignation’.25
That changed when ‘the 1950s and 1960s announced a new faith in human
progress’, driven by ‘a faith in technology’, and in legal circles, the belief that ‘if
expert knowledge could be marshalled in support of science, surely it could be
marshalled in support of law reform’.26 In 1963 was published the book Law
Reform Now, by soon-to-be Lord Chancellor Gardiner, an alumnus of England’s Law Reform Committee, and Professor Andrew Martin, making the
case that much of the common law ‘is out of date, and some of it shockingly
so’; what earlier reform eﬀorts lacked that was needed, they argued, was a
full-time commission, independent of government.27 The thesis proved inﬂuential;28 and shortly thereafter the Ontario Law Reform Commission was created
in 1964—the Commonwealth’s ﬁrst law reform commission in that sense.29
The following year, the Law Commission for England and Wales, and the Scottish Law Commission, were created.30 Similar commissions soon followed in
other Canadian jurisdictions: Nova Scotia (1969); British Columbia (1969);
Manitoba (1970); Saskatchewan (1971); Prince Edward Island (1970); Newfoundland (1971); as well as a federal commission (1971).31 The province of
Alberta also created a law reform commission in this period (1967), but
through an innovative joint venture between government, the Law Society
20

Murphy, ibid; Macdonald, ibid 831, 835–38.
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 1.
ibid.
23
ibid 1–2.
24
ibid 3; Hurlburt, Reply (n1) 885.
25
Macdonald, Recommissioning (n19) 843–44.
26
ibid.
27
Gavin Murphy, ‘The Rise, Decline and Current Status of Canada’s Law Reform Agencies’ (2004) 30 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 900, 902–03; Gerald Gardiner and Andrew Martin (eds.), Law Reform Now (Victor
Gollancz 1963).
28
Murphy, ibid.
29
Gavin Murphy, ‘Provincial Law Reform Agencies in Canada: Are They Really That Diﬀerent from the Scottish Law Commission?’ (2009) 35 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 109, 110; Patricia Hughes, ‘Lessons from
Law Reform in Ontario and Elsewhere in Canada’ in Michael Tilbury, Simon N.M. Young and Ludwig Ng
(eds.), Reforming Law Reform: Perspectives from Hong Kong and Beyond (Hong Kong University Press
2014) 87, 88.
30
Murphy, ibid 112–13.
31
ibid 116.
21
22

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION

231

and the University of Alberta, where the commission was based.32 The 1960s–
70s have been called the ‘golden age’ of Commonwealth law reform.33 A social
and political climate of prosperity, creativity, experimentation, optimism and
statism was favourable to institutional but independent law reform supported
by ‘big government’.34 Further, in an atmosphere of challenge to traditional
social arrangements and attitudes, and belief in government as a vehicle of
social progress, legal policy became a subject of prominent debate, and law
reform emerged as a means to tackle social policy issues, not just black-letter
projects.35 Legal institutions were also pushed towards more transparent,
consultative and representative processes.36 Over a period of time, law
reform commissions evolved to reach beyond experts from the bench or bar,
and beyond doctrinal methods, towards greater multidisciplinarity.37
By then, the social and political context had changed again: neo-liberalism
rose, with its values of small government, deregulation, privatisation,
eﬃciency and organisational performance.38 Meanwhile, Macdonald notes,
the earlier ambition to universalistic legal rationality was challenged by economic analysis and postmodernism, undermining intellectual conviction in
institutional law reform.39 Thus, from various corners, enthusiasm declined,
and commissions struggled to survive.40 Many were closed, including Nova
Scotia (1981), Prince Edward Island (1989), Newfoundland (1992), Ontario
(1996), Canada (1992) and British Columbia (1997), whilst others including
Manitoba and Saskatchewan were downsized and ﬁnancially constrained.
However, some losses were recovered. Nova Scotia re-created a commission in 1990, and British Columbia re-established one as a non-governmental
charity with stakeholder support as with the surviving Alberta commission.41
A new national commission was launched by the federal government in 1997.
Small and with a slim budget, it was given a sweeping mandate, going so far as
developing new approaches to law, stimulating critical debate and enhancing
public information and participation in law reform.42 In 2006, it too was disbanded. But a commission was then re-established in Ontario, on a model
similar to that of Alberta’s and British Columbia’s.43
32

Murphy, LRAs (n19) 16; Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot (eds.), The Promise of Law Reform (Federation
2005) 24, 61.
Hurlburt, LRCs (n18) 117.
34
Neil Rees, ‘The Birth and Rebirth of Law Reform Agencies’ (Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, Vanuatu, September 2008), 4.
35
ibid 3–4.
36
ibid 4.
37
Macdonald, Dummies (n2) 868.
38
Rees (n34) 5.
39
Macdonald, Recommissioning (n19) 841.
40
Rees (n34) 5.
41
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 18–19.
42
Roderick Macdonald, ‘Jamais deux sans trois … Once Reform, Twice Commission, Thrice Law’ (2007) 22
(2) Canadian Journal of Law & Society 117.
43
Murphy, Canada and Scotland (n29) 109.
33
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Whilst the Canadian history reveals the closure of many commissions,
perhaps not to be overlooked is a measure of continuity in that, since 1964,
there has essentially been a commission active either nationally or in
Ontario which is home to over half of the total population of common law
provinces.44 Presently, there are also live commissions in all four Western
Canadian provinces, as well as in the Eastern Maritime region’s largest province, Nova Scotia.

2. The past
2.1. Civil law
Along with its smaller neighbour, New Brunswick, Québec is one of only two
Canadian provinces never to have had a standing law reform commission.45
However, this fact alone may be misleading. Being the only jurisdiction in
Canada which employs civil law (in its private law), Québec has unsurprisingly utilised a diﬀerent approach to law reform.46 Professor Patrick Glenn
observes, for instance, that ‘legislation, particularly in codiﬁed form, occupies
a more commanding position than in the common law provinces’ and that
‘the Québec codes … have been the object of constant attention’.47 Below, I
survey code reforms as a window into law reforms that have taken place in
Québec civil law. From this perspective, it is apparent that in its own distinct
ways, Québec has been at the vanguard of large-scale, systematic, independent, expert law reform in Canada.48
2.1.1. Substantive reform: the civil code
A remarkable past success was the Commission for the Codiﬁcation of the
Civil Laws of Lower Canada (1857–66). An independent commission was
constituted, comprising three members of the bar.49 The codiﬁcation was to
follow the Code Napoléon’s system, format and style, but not substance.50
The substance was to consist of the Province’s existing laws in civil matters,
derived mostly from various ancien régime French sources, as well as some
English law used in certain areas.51 Because it codiﬁed ‘existing’ laws, it is
sometimes viewed not as a reform; and because France had ‘new law’ (the
Code Napoléon), whilst this codiﬁcation was of ancien régime French law,
44

Around the time the OLRC closed, the LCC opened, and around when it closed, the LCO opened. Ontario
represented 50.3% of the population of common law Canada in the 2011 census.
45
There are also no commissions in Canada’s three territories (Yukon, Northwest and Nunavut).
46
Patrick Glenn, ‘Law Reform and Legal Policy in Canada’ (Institut für Rechtspolitik, Trier, 2001).
47
ibid 5.
48
Macdonald, Recommissioning (n19) 835–36.
49
Brierley, CCLC (n7) 523.
50
ibid 543–44.
51
ibid.
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it is sometimes cast as actually regressive.52 Such appraisals are doubly mistaken, as they interpret the project in terms of social law reform, which was not
the purpose; it was technical reform, as is often the aim of law reform.53
Further, they misleadingly compare the substance to the new French law as
though it was occurring in France where it would be a rewinding, rather
than comparing the situation in Québec before and after the codiﬁcation.
Two keys of this technical law reform may be seen as a consolidation and
restatement: the Commission had to pool diverse sources, poorly recorded, in
multiple languages, and state what the ‘existing law’ was, amidst uncertainty
and complexity arising from the chaotic and conﬂicting ensemble of sources.54
This task alone was a massive reform, evident from the following accounts, by
contemporary experts, of the status quo ante:
Quelles sont les lois qui nous régissent aujourd’hui? Qui peut le dire? Quel est
l’avocat, quel est le juge qui puissent dire ‘voilà la loi’. La loi, mais nous n’en
avons pas, ou du moins nous en avons trop, de si vieilles et de si nouvelles,
de si usées et de si contradictoires, que les meilleurs juristes s’y perdent … Il
n’est peut-être pas un pays au monde soumis à plus de règles de droit,
empruntés de systèmes divers … Quel esprit assez vaste pourrait embrasser et
connaître cette variété inﬁnie d’édits, de coutumes, de brocarts, d’ordonnances,
de statuts, de jurisprudence de tout genre?55

Also integral to the technical reform was systematisation, in order to pull from
the consolidated mass of legal artefacts an ordered and rational body of law:
French doctrine no longer commented on l’ancien droit, and copies of the old
authorities were becoming hard to ﬁnd.56 They were also difﬁcult to apply in a
different era and country, and as Brierley says, ‘there was no Canadian Pothier
to synthesise this confused body of uncodiﬁed law’.57 The system of the Code
Napoléon was leveraged toward this objective.58
The other key element of the technical reform was accessibility—the Code
recorded the law in a written, canonical, simpliﬁed, ‘manifestly expedient’ form.59
Besides these core aims, errors and anachronisms were corrected, and the
commissioners, who were authorised to ‘suggest such amendments as they
think desirable … with the reasons on which they are founded’, recommended
improvements numbering around 10% of the Code’s provisions.60 Through
these combined achievements, the Commission’s work was a coup of technical
law reform, and one of the largest-scale reforms of law in Canadian history.
52

ibid.
ibid 522–74.
54
ibid 533–54.
55
ibid 534–35.
56
ibid 538–40.
57
ibid 540.
58
ibid 543–44.
59
ibid 540–42.
60
ibid 566–70.
53
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Thereafter, the overall stability of the Code itself endured from 1866 until
1955 when, in order to update the Code to modern developments, a bill was
passed providing for its (1955–91) revision.61 An initial phase was presided
over by a former Chief Justice of Canada, before in 1960 an amendment
added four codiﬁers, and a year later a practitioner as new Chair of what
became known was the Bureau de révision du Code civil.62 The third and
ﬁnal phase, commencing in 1964, saw Professor Paul-André Crépeau take
the helm of a reorganised and renamed Oﬃce de révision du Code civil du
Québec. The reform further expanded in scope, ambition and resources,
including expert committees for the various areas of law, consultations and
issuance of periodic reports.63 In 1977, a draft code was completed along
with explanatory commentaries.64 The reform process continued via consultations with the government, as the draft code was amended, until the CCQ
was ultimately adopted in 1991.65
The magnitude of this project, with 43 expert committees à travers private
law, and a 36-year duration, make it one of the largest law reform projects in
Canadian history.66 The CCQ codiﬁcation reprised, in abstract terms, the
technical reform objectives of the original CCLC recodiﬁcation, but accomplished in practice in diﬀerent ways: for example, consolidation and restatement were this time not a matter of ordering old sources, but of
reformulating rules of law based on their underlying principles, and incorporating general and permanent legislation which had grown up outside the
Code, the experience of decided cases applying the Code, the insights of doctrinal commentators upon it, and actual practices under it.67 Besides technical
reforms, the CCQ recodiﬁcation had to accomplish a wide range of social law
reforms, replacing CCLC regimes that were shaped by the Province’s traditional social structures, and adapting the Code to the social and technological conditions of modern life.68
2.1.2. Procedural reform: the code of procedure
Besides substantive law via the CCLC, the Commission of 1857 was also
tasked with a major procedural reform objective of creating a Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP)—which it completed in 1866.69 On three occasions since,
61

An Act respecting the revision of the Civil Code, RSQ 1954–1955 c47.
‘Archives of the Civil Code Revision Oﬃce’ (McGill University) <http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/ccro/>
accessed 5 December 2017.
63
ibid.
64
ibid.
65
Brierley, CCQ (n9) 495.
66
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 24–25.
67
Brierley CCQ (n9) 484.
68
ibid 485, 496–99.
69
Rosalie Jukier, ‘The Impact of Legal Traditions on Québec Procedural Law: Lessons from Québec’s New
Code of Civil Procedure (2015) 93 Canadian Bar Review 1, 13–14.
62
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commissions or expert committees have conducted work resulting in
wholesale recodiﬁcations of the CCP.70 An 1897 recodiﬁcation sought to
more fully implement English Law’s adversarial procedure, eliminating the
French enquête and embracing the open courts principle.71 A 1965 recodiﬁcation principally strove to decrease procedural formalism.72 The last and most
recent recodiﬁcation (2014) was a 15-year project, inspired by the UK’s Woolf
Report: a provincial expert committee generated the Ferland Report (2001),
leading to important amendments in 2002 and 2009 aimed at improving
access to justice through reforms such as case management, procedural
proportionality, promotion of settlements and penalties for abusing freedoms
of adversarial procedure.73 Following public consultations, the reforms
ultimately culminated in the new CCP en vigueur since 2016, whose
goals include reducing cost, complexity and delay in litigation, and requiring
a spirit of cooperation in parties’ exercise of procedural rights. In a rapprochement more towards traditional civilian procedure, its reforms include
limitations on discovery, changes with respect to experts, cost rules and
formal documents, as well as an innovation of presenting ADR as a
primary aim.74

2.1.3. Law reform and codiﬁcation in Québec civil law
Reform in Québec civil law has followed a somewhat distinctive pattern.75 The
doctrinal system lacking the same incremental law reform achieved by the
common law through its recognition of caselaw, civil law in Québec has
relied importantly on codes to deliver reform.76 The pace has tended to be
of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, comprising ﬂourishes of sweeping reform punctuating periods of relative doctrinal equilibrium in between.77 In this pattern,
the law’s system is seemingly better preserved, but its content at greater risk of
becoming progressively out of date, or of patchwork legislative responses proliferating which are not integrated into the doctrinal system, until a critical
point is reached, requiring large-scale reform. In this context, commissions
that would operate continuously have been called for on the basis that they
might help keep the system more constantly updated.78

70

ibid 2, 14–15.
ibid 14.
72
ibid 16.
73
ibid 2, 14–18.
74
ibid 19–20, 25–26; Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR cC-25.01, Preliminary Provision, Book I Title I.
75
Glenn (n46) 5.
76
ibid.
77
Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibrium (Belknap 2007).
78
Brierley, CCLC (n7) 573; Cantin-Cumyn (n15) 479.
71
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2.2. Common law
2.2.1. Former provincial law commissions
2.2.1.1. Ontario Law Reform Commission (1964–96). A preeminent ‘ﬁrst generation’ provincial commission was the Ontario Law Reform Commission
(OLRC).79 Dating to 1964, it preceded the UK commissions, and was the
ﬁrst of what are now recognised as Commonwealth law reform commissions.80
With the OLRC began the trend, typical of Canadian commissions but diﬀering
from UK commissions, of choosing projects independently of government,
although the OLRC was also expected to handle Attorney-General references.81
The OLRC was also notable then in the extent of its reliance on external
researchers, particularly academics drawn from Ontario’s six law faculties of
that time.82 Project advisory boards included representatives from academia,
practice and relevant interest groups.83 Draft reports were prepared for internal
review and revision, before reaching a ﬁnal report presented to the AttorneyGeneral, containing the Commission’s views and sometimes draft legislation.84
OLRC’s track-record of 120 ﬁnal reports over 33 years of operation, spanning
diverse issues including court organisation, class actions and artiﬁcial reproduction, did not avert a fate suﬀered by many Canadian commissions.85 In
1996, it was abolished in a cost-cutting move by the Conservative government
of Mike Harris.86 However, the OLRC importantly inﬂuenced other Canadian
commissions, and its legacy inspired Ontario to later re-establish a new commission in 2006, as the Attorney-General stated:
For many years, the previous Law Reform Commission was an important
instrument of change in our province’s legal system. It was known to
forward progressive ideas, ask tough questions, and engage in creative, innovative, critical thinking. Our justice system needs the same capacity today.87

2.2.1.2. British Columbia Law Reform Commission (1969–97). British
Columbia’s Law Reform Commission was active since 1970.88 Institutionally,
it was modelled on the broad lines of the Law Commission for England and
Wales, including government approval of projects. Members were typically
practitioners and legal academics. In its 27 years, the Commission produced
79

Macdonald, Dummies (n2) 868.
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 13–15.
81
Murphy, Canada and Scotland (n29) 110.
82
ibid.
83
ibid.
84
ibid.
85
ibid; Glenn (n46) 6.
86
Murphy, ibid.
87
Ontario, ‘Attorney General Establishes New Law Commission Of Ontario’ (Ontario, November 2006)
<https://news.ontario.ca/archive/en/2006/11/30/Attorney-General-Establishes-New-Law-CommissionOf-Ontario.html> accessed 5 December 2017.
88
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 17.
80
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over 140 reports on a diversity of topics, as well as an online law reform database and index of collected Commonwealth law reform materials.89 In 1997,
the Commission was terminated when the government eliminated its
funding.90
2.2.1.3. Commissions in the Maritime provinces (1969–92). Three of the four
Maritime provinces created law reform commissions that later closed.91 Nova
Scotia’s Law Reform Advisory Commission (1969–90) was active from 1972.
Its activities were kept tightly connected to government. Projects required
government support.92 The Province’s legislative counsel doubled as secretary
and executive oﬃcer of the Commission, with shared staﬀ.93 And the Commission could not publish reports without Attorney-General approval.94
Over nine years, the Commission investigated 17 areas of law.95 But in
1981, budgetary concerns and conviction that the Attorney-General could
fulﬁl the necessary functions led the Province to let members’ appointments
lapse.96 Its authorising statute was ﬁnally repealed in 1990.97 A broadly similar
picture emerges of Newfoundland’s Law Reform Commission (1971–92),
which was active from 1981.98 Commissioners were appointed by Cabinet,
and the Minister of Justice could refer matters to the Commission.99 In
1992, to reduce government expenditures, Newfoundland eliminated its commission’s funding.100 Prince Edward Island’s Law Reform Commission
(1970–89) was active from 1976.101 In theory, it was modelled on the
OLRC. However, it lacked strong support from government and the legal
community.102 The province eliminated its budget in 1983, and the statute
was repealed in 1989.103
2.2.2. Former national law commissions
2.2.2.1. Law Reform Commission of Canada (1971–92). The ﬁrst national
commission, the Law Reform Commission of Canada (LRCC), began operations in 1971. Like most commissions of the era, it was intended to work
89
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closely with government.104 Indeed, to complement it, a new wing of the
Department of Justice was simultaneously created and charged with responsibility for law reform, research and statutory revision.105 However, the Commission was given a bold mandate. It was tasked, for instance, not only with
considering new laws, but new approaches to law.106 It was also required to
consult widely.107 Taking up these challenges, the LRCC completed major
projects in public law including a Criminal Code revision, incorporated interdisciplinary expertise and conducted empirical studies, and on social policy
issues undertook background studies and working papers not ﬁxated on
immediate proposals.108 Expanding on consultations, it visited law faculties
across Canada, engaged student researchers, and published oﬃcial work in
public-friendly formats.109 By conventional measures, its collaboration with
government was spottier. For instance, in its ﬁrst decade, none of its recommendations were enacted by government, and only twice in its lifetime
did the Minister request a study by the Commission.110 In 1992, the federal
Conservative government disbanded the LRCC, seeking to save expense
and eliminate duplication.111 When a new national law commission was
later re-established, its founding president noted the LRCC’s distinct achievements, calling it ‘a pioneer in many respects’.112

2.2.2.2. Law Commission of Canada (1997–2006). A second incarnation of a
national law commission came to life in 1997 as the Law Commission of
Canada (LCC). A president and four other commissioners were appointed
by Cabinet.113 The LCC also had an Advisory Committee of 12–24 persons,
to be representative of common and civil law, non-legal disciplines and
social diversity.114 The Commission empanelled speciﬁc project groups comprising persons with relevant expertise.115 In terms of its statutory mandate,
and its pursuit of that mandate, the LCC was even bolder than its predecessor.116 The LCC’s work had to be open, inclusive and understandable to all
Canadians. It had to employ a multidisciplinary approach, innovate in its
work methods and develop new concepts of law. It had to stimulate critical
debate and forge productive networks among academic and other
104
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communities. And it had to ﬁnd measures to make the legal system more
accessible, eﬃcient and economical.117 Embracing these challenges, the LCC
typically eschewed matters of speciﬁc legislation or of trying to complement
government policy agendas, and strove to address broader and longer-term
issues facing Canadian society.118 Instead of doctrinal categories of legal
inquiry, it examined social interaction through four relationship-types (personal, social, economic and governance), and queried what the law’s role
should be in each.119 To deliver ‘participatory law reform’, and better leverage
its limited human and ﬁnancial resources, the LCC worked with various
outside partners to expand its reach.120 As for traditional law reform activities,
the government only once referred a matter for LCC study, and the LCC
avoided draft legislation or conventional recommendations.121 Struck by
the LCC’s ‘wide-ranging ambit’, former England and Wales commissioner
Andrew Burrows remarked that it was ‘plainly very diﬀerent indeed from
the English Law Commission. Indeed it provides a fascinating contrast to it
… Indeed I would hesitate to call it a law reform body at all. It seems to be
more of a social policy think-tank’.122 Despite its diﬀerences from more traditional commissions even in Canada, the LCC suﬀered the same fate: in 2006,
the Conservative government of Stephen Harper declined to renew its budget,
citing concerns of cost and redundancy.123
2.2.3. The recurrent closure of law reform commissions in Canada
Institutional law reform in common law Canada is notable for the frequent
termination of ‘permanent’ commissions. From that story, some patterns
emerge relevant to the present and future of law reform in Canada.
First, and perhaps most obviously, government cost-cutting has repeatedly
felled Canadian commissions. Reformists have aptly remarked that in times of
belt-tightening, commissions are an easy target since law reform has no
speciﬁc political constituency.124 However, it must be acknowledged that
many government agencies lacking a speciﬁc political constituency exist
and continuously survive.
Second, and related, a reversion of law reform from independent commissions to government ministries favours ideology over expertise as its guide,
highlighting the political trilemma faced by Law Reform Commission: if a
commission focuses on practical reforms, but disregards government
117
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priorities, its work may be ignored by government, and the commission
seen as irrelevant.125 If a commission is both practical and responsive to
the government agenda, it risks the political opposition perceiving the
commission to have lost its independence and decrying its political
unaccountability—placing the commission at peril when there is a change
in government.126 If a commission tries to avoid the concrete policy sphere
altogether, it may be seen as impractical, ‘amorphous’ or indeed ‘not a law
reform body at all’.127
Third, it was suggested that other entities served whatever need government had for external advice on law reform, so that the commissions were
unneeded and redundant. Law societies, think thanks and advocacy groups,
for instance, could provide government the salient information, be it the
latest research, expert opinions or the perspectives of interested parties.128
And meantime, they seemed to ﬁt better with the system, usually focusing
on issues that governments see as priorities, and in a way practical and expedient, as compared to law commissions.129
The fourth pattern is implicit in the others, and in additional more speciﬁc
observations which had been made—changes in social context, for which
the commissions institutionally designed in the 1960s–70s, and reﬂecting
the social context and associated outlooks of that era, were no longer suited.130

3. The present
3.1. Civil law
Presently, there is no standing law reform commission in Québec. Yet, interestingly, long before the founding of the commissions in common law
Canada, the Lower Canada codiﬁcation commissioners, in their ﬁnal
Report in 1864, recommended creation of a permanent body to conduct periodic revisions of the law and provide reports to government addressing
deﬁciencies as they became evident.131 The suggestion was not implemented.
As part of the century-later CCQ recodiﬁcation, a similar suggestion was
again made. This time, through a 1992 bill, the government authorised one:
to be funded by the Province, and named the Institut québécois de réforme
du droit.132 It represented, in fact, a formal undertaking by the Minister of
Justice in order to correct remaining defects in the CCQ and keep it
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continuously updated.133 In conception, the reform institute was quite broad:
its mission was described in the Act as
reform and development of law, through means which include adapting the
judicial system to the needs of society, simplifying, codifying, and seeking consistency among the rules of law, and rendering more humane the institutions
involved in the administration of justice.134

Its processes might involve not only internal research, but promoting collaboration among outside experts, and studying reform proposals of interested
persons.135 The Institute was thus conceived in terms broadly similar to
other Canadian law reform commissions.136 However, thus far the authorised
Institute has never been brought into force.
Following the 36-year ‘odyssey’ of the Code’s revision, a reform fatigue at
that time might be understandable.137 More recently, an Act Respecting the
Compilation of Québec Laws and Regulations (2009) lays groundwork for
potential future reforms.138 It provides for the compilation of provincial
laws ‘of a general and permanent nature’, which could be considered for
inclusion in a future recodiﬁcation.139 It also provides for the compilation
of other laws and regulations, similar to U.S. states’ ‘Revised Statutes’.140 As
part of this, the Act authorises minor revisions, including concerning legislative drafting issues.141 The Act also empowers the Minister to order a legislative consolidation when needed.142

3.2. Common law
3.2.1. Overview
All existing common law commissions operate with limited resources, including what ﬁnancial support they receive from their government and law foundation.143 Their principal mandate is to complete reform projects, be they
lawyer’s law or social policy. The former type is more common, such projects
generally being more circumscribed, manageable and politically uncontroversial than the latter.144 Projects tend to culminate in reform proposals to be
implemented via legislation.145 Besides commissioners and limited staﬀs, the
133
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commissions often encompass advisory boards, and engage in public consultations.146 Compared to other countries, academics rather than judges more
often play leading roles.147 The commissions operate with signiﬁcant transparency, and increasingly emphasise public outreach and communications in
order to sustain support, appreciation and interest in their work.148 Projects
may come from government or other sources, but often arise from expert suggestions and consultations.149 Typically, work is led by speciﬁc project teams
comprising commission personnel and sometimes outside experts. The
process tends to be staged, with initial research perhaps followed by a draft publication, consultations and ultimately a ﬁnal report.150 Currently, six Canadian
common law jurisdictions have active commissions. They share information
and experiences, but seldom engage in formal joint projects, due to diﬀerent
priorities, and institutional considerations.151
3.2.2. ‘Traditional’ law commissions
Three of the existing Canadian commissions (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Nova Scotia) are seen as being of the ‘traditional’ model of those (apart from
Alberta) set up in Canada and the UK in the 1960s–70s.152 These are extensively
tied to government: they are statutorily designed and funded by government,
with largely government-appointed commissioners, are expected to accept projects referred by government and report to the Minister of Justice.153 Additional
ﬁnancial support comes from the provincial law foundation, which invests the
interest from lawyers’ trust accounts, and distributes the proceeds to causes
including the commission.154 From both sources, funding is very limited,
with the result, in Hurlburt’s estimation, that they can ‘function only at a
very low level of activity’,155 making it diﬃcult to tackle large-scale projects.156
3.2.2.1. Manitoba Law Reform Commission. The Manitoba Law Reform
Commission (MLRC) was founded by statute in 1970. It is funded by government and the law foundation.157 The MLRC has 5–7 commissioners, which
must include one judge, one practitioner, one law professor and one nonlawyer.158 It also has a small staﬀ, presently including two legal counsel and
146
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an administrator.159 Its reform mandate is general, and projects may be
chosen from suggestions by the Minister of Justice, the legal profession or
the public.160 Following research and consultations, recommendations are
presented to the Minister.161 The MLRC has produced over 100 reports,
and most have been implemented by government.162 Following a peak
period, cuts to its resources in 1997 have posed a signiﬁcant limitation.163
Past successes include reforms in Family and Municipal Law and on professional regulation.164 Presently, the MLRC is pursuing a ‘series’ of circumscribed projects in the realm of improving access and eﬃciency in the
administration of justice.165
3.2.2.2. Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan. The Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan was founded by government in 1973. Its funding
comes from government and the law foundation. Its mandate is to simplify
and modernise the law, by keeping it under review, and by pursuing projects
of systematic development and reform.166 All commissioners are government-appointed, and the Commission works closely with the Ministry of
Justice.167 Currently, the Commission has six members (along with a director
of research).168 It can also establish non-member project committees.169
Project suggestions are open, and once initiated, the process involves internal
research and external consultations, and ultimately recommendations to the
Minister.170 The Commission has made suggestions in a number of areas
over the years.171 However, its very limited funding is a serious restriction.172
3.2.2.3. Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia. Its original commission
having closed, Nova Scotia instituted a new commission in 1991.173 Like
the other existing traditional commissions, its funding comes from government and the law foundation.174 There are between ﬁve and seven commissioners, which must include one judge, two licensed practitioners, one law
159
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professor and one non-lawyer.175 The Commission has a broad mandate.176
Many projects are referred by government; however, project suggestions are
open to the public, and public consultations play an important role in the
Commission’s processes.177 Reports and recommendations are presented to
the Minister of Justice.178 But the Commission is independent and expected
to oﬀer non-partisan recommendations.179 Its track record includes achievements in Family Law and the administration of justice.180 As with Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia’s commission is constrained by limited operating funds.181
3.2.3. Joint venture law commissions
Currently, three Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario)
have active law reform commissions not designed on the traditional model.
Whereas the traditional commissions are in many ways government commissions, the non-traditional commissions are joint ventures among multiple stakeholders. Unlike the traditional commissions: these are not designed and
created by statute; their resources are provided and commissioners decided
by multiple stakeholders; they have extensive latitude to select their own projects; and they are not bound to report through the Minister of Justice.182
With greater funding and inter-institutional support, they can take on more
ambitious projects in both scale and substance, including research or
reform regarding signiﬁcant or emerging social issues.183
3.2.3.1. Alberta Law Reform Institute. Alberta’s commission, the second
established in Canada (1967), and the longest-running, was unique then
(and for three decades) in not being a statutory creature, but the result of
an arrangement between the Law Society of Alberta, the University of
Alberta and government.184 Its support rests on continuation agreements
between the founding bodies.185 It is based at the Alberta Law Faculty,
whilst its funding comes primarily from government and the law foundation.186 Known as the Alberta Law Reform Institute (ALRI), its reform
mandate of ‘advancing just and eﬀective laws through independent legal
175
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research, consultation, and analysis’ is broad, and expected to include consideration of how to make the law more useful and eﬀective, and proposals
for substantive or administrative reform.187 Independence and objectivity
are core values, and ALRI is not required to accept government references,
nor direct its proposals to government.188 Collaboration with the law faculties
of Alberta and the University of Calgary, and public consultations, are important features.189 A 14-member Board, drawn from the founding parties and
the broader legal community, regularly supervises the Institute’s activities.190
Past reports over its 50-year history cover a wide range of topics, with a trackrecord of signiﬁcant reforms including in Civil Procedure and Enforcement,
Company Law, Family Law, Arbitration, Landlord-Tenant and Criminal
Victims’ Compensation.191
3.2.3.2. British Columbia Law Institute. Concern aroused by government’s
closing of British Columbia’s commission in 1997 led to contemporaneous
formation of the British Columbia Law Institute (BCLI) as a non-proﬁt corporation under the Province’s Society Act.192 The Institute is based at the University of British Columbia.193 BCLI core funding comes from the law
foundation, the government (since 2003) and private charitable donations.194
Project funding comes additionally from the Institute’s ‘stakeholders’—the
Attorney-General, Law Society, Society of Notaries Public, provincial
branch of the Canadian Bar Association and the Province’s three law faculties
(British Columbia, Victoria and Thompson Rivers)—besides other foundations and funding programmes.195 The BCLI is constituted to promote:
clariﬁcation and simpliﬁcation of the law, adaptation of the law to modern
social needs, improvement in the administration of justice, respect for the
rule of law and scholarly legal research.196 The Institute collaborates with government and other entities, and engages in public information and outreach.197 Its board comprises 16 members, including 10 appointed by
stakeholders.198 In its ﬁrst 20 years, the Institute has released 62 reports
spanning diverse areas.199 Current projects include employment standards,
and ﬁnancing litigation.200 The BCLI also houses the Canadian Centre for
187
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Elder Law, which focuses on legal issues and practice aﬀecting older
persons.201

3.2.3.3. Law Commission of Ontario. A decade after government terminated
the OLRC, a new Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) was created in 2007.
Institutionally, it follows the ALRI model, while philosophically it bears similarities to the national LCC disbanded just beforehand. The LCO rests on
agreement between government, the Law Society, the law foundation,
Osgoode Hall Law School (where LCO is based) and the deans of the Province’s other law faculties.202 Five-year continuation agreements were
approved in 2012 and 2017.203 LCO funding comes from all parties to the
agreement including Osgoode but excluding the other law faculties.204 Each
funder appoints a member to its supervising board, along with the other
law deans collectively, and the Ontario judiciary.205 A separate research
board advises on projects.206 The LCO has an executive director and small
in-house staﬀ, supplemented by seconded counsel-in-residence and by law
student volunteers from Ontario’s law schools.207 The Commission’s aims
evince a focus on access to justice, and a perspective encouraging of scholarly
contributions; its mandate is to: make the legal system more relevant, accessible and eﬃcient; simplify or clarify the law; use technology to increase access
to justice; stimulate critical debate about law; and promote scholarly legal
research.208 Multidisciplinarity is endorsed.209 The LCO chooses its own projects, and follows a dual-track policy of more limited black-letter or ‘doctrinal
projects’, concurrent with ‘broad projects’ of social law reform.210 The LCO
has completed a number of ambitious projects, including several concerned
with vulnerable groups. Its current portfolio encompasses class actions, and
internet defamation; and its upcoming agenda targets Indigenous Law, Law
& Technology, and the Regulation of Public Space.211 Some projects
produce outputs designed for non-government bodies: for instance, on vulnerable groups, a framework was developed for organisations (including
private sector); another initiative created curricular modules for law schools
on violence against women.212
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3.3. Law reform associations
Besides the law reform commissions themselves, Canada has umbrella organisations through which commissions associate or coordinate. The two most
important of these are discussed below.
3.3.1. Federation of Law Reform Agencies of Canada (FOLRAC)
FOLRAC was incorporated in 1990 as an association of the provincial commissions.213 Its focus is on furthering law reform through inter-commission
sharing of information, experiences and assistance.214 After the LCC’s
demise, the idea of FOLRAC taking up the mandate of a national law
reform commission was considered but rejected at the 2010 annual
meeting.215 Deliberation on whether FOLRAC should assume a lobbying
function for reforms also occurred, but the consensus remains that it
should focus on knowledge-sharing among the commissions. To this end,
recent initiatives have sought to involve staﬀ at all levels, not just commission
leaders.216
3.3.2. Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC)
ULCC, founded in 1918, is another Canadian inter-jurisdictional body seen as
engaged in law reform.217 Its aim is to improve legal harmonisation across
Canadian provinces, and where appropriate, federal law.218 ULCC comprises
a Civil Section (within which Commercial Law is a priority); a Criminal
Section (which recommends reforms to correct deﬁciencies, gaps or problems
of judicial interpretation in Criminal Law, a federal power); and a Drafting
Section (supporting the other two sections).219 An annual meeting draws delegates from government in each jurisdiction, reform commissions, bar associations, judges, academics and practitioners, whilst ULCC work continues
year-round.220
3.4. Other types of organisation involved in law reform
Besides independent, expert, generalist law reform commissions, several other
specialised types of organisation are active and highly inﬂuential in shaping
law reform in Canada.221 These include special government units, commissions
213

Federation of Law Reform Agencies of Canada, <http://www.folrac.com/our-history.html> accessed 5
December 2017.
ibid.
215
ibid.
216
ibid; Hughes (n29) 92.
217
Murphy, Canada and Scotland (n29) 114.
218
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, <http://ulcc.ca/en> accessed 5 December 2017.
219
ibid.
220
Hughes (n29) 93.
221
Macdonald, Dummies (n2) 881; Opeskin & Weisbrot (n32) 55–72, 261–329, 388–404.
214

248

M. MOORE

of inquiry, law faculties, law societies and various types of private sector organisations. Macdonald believes public legal education organisations should also be
included, as they help citizens engage with law and participate in reform: reform
of ‘oﬃcial’ law on the books of government, courts and treatises; but especially
reform of ‘unoﬃcial’ law, which he describes as the way the law is actually practised—when those daily practices change, law is reformed on the ground.222
The organisations considered in this section diﬀer from law commissions
in important dimensions. These other types mentioned, and some of their key
diﬀerences from commissions, are surveyed below.
3.4.1. Special government units
Perhaps the most obvious source of law reform is government itself. Besides the
main channels of the legislature, executive, administrative tribunals and courts,
some special government units have functions playing a role in law reform.223
These include parliamentary committees, standing and ad hoc executive committees, the Ministry of Justice and other ministerial policy groups.224
Of note, New Brunswick, the only Canadian common law province which
has never had a law reform commission, instead created contemporaneously
with these (1971) a law reform section within its Justice Department, known
since 1993 as the Legislative Services Branch.225
But whilst some government units involved in law reform may hold expertise, a crucial distinction between them and the commissions is the latter’s
independence.
3.4.2. Commissions of inquiry
Commissions of Inquiry (including Royal Commissions)226 have played a signiﬁcant reform role in Canada.227 They consist of independent ad hoc commissions created by government to investigate matters of major public
importance, report ﬁndings and provide recommendations to government.228
Historically, Canada has seen many such commissions.229 Two prominent
recent examples concerned public corruption: the federal Gomery Commission (2004–06) produced advice leading to the Federal Accountability Act.
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And Québec’s Charbonneau Commission oﬀered recommendations that
include now enacted whistle-blower protections.230
Similar, but more expedient and closer to government are Task Forces.231
This tool was recently used by Canada’s federal government on the social
policy reform issue of legalising marijuana.232 Even closer to government
are departmental inquiries, which are very widely used to address speciﬁc predetermined problems and propose reforms.233
Commissions of inquiry share with law reform commissions common features such as independence and expertise, but diﬀer in that they principally deal
with a speciﬁc predetermined issue, whereas law commissions are responsible
for the whole body of law, and can themselves decide what the issues are.
3.4.3. Law faculties
Another important institution in Canadian law reform is the academy.
Although law faculties rarely engage directly in law reform, they contribute
to it in important ways. For instance, academic legal and policy research institutes produce work which informs law reform in their relevant ﬁelds.
Examples include McGill’s Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative
Law, the University of Toronto’s Centre for Innovation Law and Policy,
UBC’s Centre for Law and the Environment and the University of Alberta’s
Health Law Institute. Also, the scholarship of individual law professors is
an essential part of the law reform picture, providing background research
and analysis leveraged by law reform personnel. Moreover, academics, in educating future practitioners, judges, attorneys-general, law commissioners, etc.,
help shape the way the legal system’s various actors will perceive problems,
methodologies and solutions.234 Law faculties also formally support
Canada’s non-traditional law commissions.
Law faculties, like law commissions, oﬀer expertise and independence.
However, it is not their institutional role to approach reform in a direct, dedicated or systematic way.
3.4.4. Law societies
Law societies are also involved with law reform. For example, they are partners in each of Canada’s three current non-traditional commissions. They
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are also linked to law foundations, which contribute funding to all existing
Canadian commissions. Further, the Canadian Bar Association has a
reform subcommittee to coordinate its eﬀorts to improve the law and the
justice system.235 Provincial law societies may also have ad hoc advisory committees on speciﬁc law reform subjects, such as the Barreau du Québec currently does on topics including access to justice and consumer protection.236
Like law commissions, law societies boast expertise and are independent of
government. However, as the profession’s representative bodies, societies’
investment in the law risks conﬂict with reform needs, and their innate constitution excludes non-legal-professional perspectives.237
3.4.5. Private sector organisations
A wide range of private sector organisations are also active players in the
Canadian law reform arena. These include advocacy groups, such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association or the National Citizens Coalition, that
advance particular social policy reforms they espouse. Similar, but with somewhat diﬀerent methodologies, are activist groups, such as Greenpeace or Idle
No More. Also inﬂuential are special interest groups or ‘lobbies’, such as the
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers or Option consommateurs,
which push for social policies serving vested interests. Signiﬁcant as well
are think tanks, such as CD Howe or the Fraser Institute, which fund and
publish research and policy advice in support of reforms consistent with
their founding visions. As well, private consultancy ﬁrms may produce
reports, or be contracted by government to advise on potential reforms.238
Private sector organisations may help contribute non-legal perspectives to
the law reform endeavour. But they diﬀer markedly from law reform commissions in the impartiality aspired to by the commissions.

4. The future
What does the future hold for law reform in Canada?
4.1. The ongoing need for institutional law reform
Given the frequent closure of commissions in common law Canada, and the
fact that the core of Québec civil law has already been codiﬁed and recodiﬁed
in its relatively short history, one cannot avoid posing the question: Are the
governments that have closed, restricted or declined to continue law commissions (and critics of law commissions, who have supported such decisions)
235

Canadian Bar Association, (Law Reform Subcommittee) <http://www.cba.org/Sections/Legislation-andLaw-Reform> accessed 5 December 2017.
Macdonald, Jamais (n42) 137–38; Barreau du Québec, <http://www.barreau.qc.ca/fr/barreau/comites/
index.html#comites-consultatifs> accessed 5 December 2017.
237
Murphy, LRAs (n19) 49–50.
238
Macdonald, Jamais (n42) 138–39.
236

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION

251

right that institutional law reform is not a worthwhile investment, and that the
labour of independent expert law commissions in Canada is superﬂuous at
best? Or, notwithstanding this scepticism, is there indeed a distinct and
ongoing need for independent, dedicated, institutional law reform in Canada?
The leading experts in the ﬁeld, even after the signiﬁcant and recurrent
reverses that have occurred in Canada, have stayed steadfast in their belief
in the indispensability of independent, dedicated law reform commissions.
Hurlburt warned that the public interest would ‘suﬀer greatly’ from their discontinuance’, whilst Macdonald, even at the most discouraging point,
defended their need as justiﬁed. Gavin Murphy, author of the last treatise
on the commissions, goes so far as to suggest in fact that the ‘justiﬁcation
… may be even more compelling today than’ when commissions were
founded. And Yves LeBouthillier, last president of the LCC, remains ‘convinced’ that a new national commission will, by virtue of inherent necessity,
one day resurface.239
If the phenomenon of commissions being revived in jurisdictions where
they were previously extinguished suggests retrospective recognition of a
mistake, the need for law commissions may be further evident in how three
Canadian commissions now in existence (Ontario’s LCO, British Columbia’s
BCLI and Nova Scotia’s Law Reform Commission) are in provinces that disbanded their original commissions.240 Further, all remaining commissions are
supported in part by their government.241 Even regarding those abolished,
Hurlburt ﬁnds the fact government ever tolerated their independence as
showing ‘the strength of the underlying idea’.242
That idea arose, in part, because of continuous social change that the law
either fell behind or else the law proliferated into a patchwork that required
reform into a suitably-functioning system.243 In founding the LRCC in
1970, former Prime Minister (then Justice Minister) John Turner said: ‘Our
society is changing, and [the law] must ensure that it changes for the
better’.244 In order to fulﬁl this societal vocation, as Turner implied, the law
must continuously reform itself. This was the distinct task of dedicated,
expert law commissions. As simply stated as that rationale for law reform
commissions may be, it is as sure as it is timeless. Indeed, gazing into the
future, that rationale appears stronger than ever, as the law must grapple
with such ‘complex issues facing today’s society [as] would have been
unthinkable even a generation ago’.245 The last generation, Glenn argues,
was preoccupied with reform through the courts: interpreting Canada’s
239
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‘new’ constitutional Charter of Rights (1982).246 The next generation is bound
to be concerned, rather, with profound and disparate technological transformations of society spanning almost every aspect of formal and informal
social life, and extending to such existential matters as humanity’s relationships: on one hand, with the created natural environment; on the other
hand, with its own intelligence-imbued artiﬁcial creations; and in between,
with itself through its increasing capacity for intervention into the innate conditions of human life and death.
But, as oft-suggested when commissions were closed in the past, can’t government handle these tasks internally? Former Ontario Attorney-General
Michael Bryant heard that mantra, but in establishing the LCO oﬀered the following response:
Some say [law reform] is strictly the role of government … But now, more than
ever, governments work in an environment where there are competing priorities and signiﬁcant [political] pressures to respond to issues of immediate
concern. This can make it diﬃcult to focus resources on pragmatic law
reform or controversial social policy issues, even though they might ultimately
be of great assistance … That’s where the Law Commission would step in’.247

In contemporary Canadian society, no one can fail to appreciate the extent to
which other organisations can and do wade into law reform. But as set out in
Section 3.4, none of these share the set of characteristics aspired to by law
commissions that make them specially ﬁt-for-purpose: independent, impartial, dedicated, expert, systematic, general, comprehensive.248 Indeed, the partiality of many private sector organisations whose inﬂuence has in recent years
exploded is particularly at odds with the ideal of reform as improvement, and
not simply change, in the law.249 To the extent such inﬂuence does generate
law reform, often the reform it pursues is not reform in the general interest,
but in predetermined special interests.
4.2. Assessing the past and considering the future of law reform in
Canada
Despite its need, the story of institutional law reform in Canada is indeed
‘somewhat troubling’. There have been notable successes and failures alike.
In Québec civil law, the codiﬁcations were remarkable achievements which
realised sweeping and generally highly-esteemed reforms. But the codiﬁers’
recommendations to maintain them through continuously-operating commissions have not been implemented, and hence other legislation has
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proliferated whilst the doctrinal system has waited long periods to be updated.
Canadian common law provinces have also, at times, been leaders: Ontario
founded the ﬁrst Commonwealth law reform commission in 1964, and
Alberta innovated its internationally-inﬂuential joint venture commission
as early as 1967. Further, Canada’s original national commission ambitiously
tackled important social issues, and the second national commission profoundly challenged the limitations of conventional legal paradigms. Across
the country, many commissions were established. But many commissions
were also closed or constrained, impeded from accomplishing what they
might have. Burrows, comparing them to the UK commissions, appraises:
The history of law reform agencies in Canada, at least from the outside, is a
rather depressing one. Stability and success do not appear to have been
achieved either at the provincial or federal level. Why that should be so is
not clear to me.250

One thing that is clear from Canada’s story is that there is ‘no one way to
design a law commission’.251 Some have been open-ended, whilst others,
like the codiﬁcations, have been deﬁned projects. Some have been traditionally-designed creatures of government, whilst others have been underwritten
by stakeholder agreements.252 Some have focused largely on lawyer’s law,
whilst others have pursued broader technical reforms, and still others have
confronted social issues or conceptual questions. To Macdonald, these ‘problems of institutional design and instrument choice’ highlight ‘the necessity
to think carefully’ about what the future of institutional law reform in
Canada ‘should look like’.253
Whilst a comprehensive answer to that cannot be covered here, below I
oﬀer some brief reﬂections based on above-noted patterns in the struggle of
institutional law reform in Canada until now.

4.3. Addressing some key challenges of the Canadian law reform
experience
4.3.1. Civil law
4.3.1.1. Reform continuity. As discussed, Québec civil law has repeatedly
faced a need to undertake onerous reform projects in the manner of a comprehensive legal overhaul, in order to reintegrate sources that weren’t kept
consolidated, or to catch up with legal deﬁciencies that weren’t incrementally
kept pace with, or to restore law’s responsiveness to social change. Both Civil
Code commissions called for the creation of a permanent body which could
250
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fulﬁl these needs, alleviating the pattern described. Legislation was enacted in
1992 which would enable that, but it has not been implemented. However,
more recent developments may signal a shift in that direction. In particular,
2010 legislation provides for continuous compilation of laws, including
minor revisions, and authority to order consolidations as needed. In so
doing, it makes a distinction useful in considering laws which might merit
inclusion in a revised civil code, and others. Further, the recent CCP recodiﬁcation atypically unfolded as a series of reforms successively instituted over a
15-year period, making for somewhat more graduated change. If a standing
body is created to continuously tackle reform needs as they emerge, the question arises of how it should be constituted. The 1992 Act contemplated a government creature. However, given the recent history of institutional law
reform in Canada, one must wonder whether a joint venture approach
might be preferable. To that issue I now turn.
4.3.2. Common Law
4.3.2.1. Resource stability. One ‘enemy’ of institutional law reform in Canada,
described above, has been government cost-cutting.254 Many commissions
were eliminated or restricted by government ﬁscal restraint.255 Experts ﬁnd
this unsurprising, as the ﬁrst wave of commission creation was
after all, the product of a political era of welfare liberalism. [Commissions] had
yet to confront the present neo-liberal era, with its emphasis on economic
eﬃciency, small government, government by contract, and the application to
the public sector of management techniques developed in the private sector.256

Government today remains importantly, if not increasingly, inﬂuenced by the
imperatives of New Public Management, Small Government and Privatisation.257 And since law reform ‘has no basic political constituency’,258 in
austere times, commissions are easily cast as an unaffordable luxury—‘a relatively easy target’ for elimination.259 How can commissions manage this
continual threat, whilst maintaining independence from government?260
The Canadian experience is notable in that the commission created in 1967
in the country’s most ﬁscally conservative jurisdiction did not follow the
mould used elsewhere of a pure government creature: Alberta’s commission
was a joint venture with the Province’s law society and legal academy.
Later, when the two largest common law provinces, Ontario and British
254
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Columbia, lost their law commissions as welfarism gave way to retrenchment,
they re-created commissions patterned broadly on the ALRI model. The
rationale is that multiple bases of support better protect commissions from
vulnerability to government budget cuts.261 This diversiﬁcation could
indeed help commissions survive the loss of any one support-group.262 Presently, all three joint venture commissions remain active, and signiﬁcantly
better resourced than the surviving Canadian traditional commissions.
In considering the future of law commissions in Canada, the experience to
date suggests that the joint venture model may oﬀer the best security,
resources and institutional support. Assuming a lone funder enhances risk
of agency capture (or closure, in the case of government law reform commissions), it may also strengthen commission independence.263 For legal institutions (law societies, law faculties, etc.), this partnership model might also
foster a greater sense of ownership of the state of the law and the need for
reform, whilst making the commission accountable to a broader set of legitimate stakeholders. Although to date this commission structure remains
internationally unconventional, we should therefore not be surprised to see
this model dominate the future landscape of institutional law reform in
Canada. If new commissions are created—particularly another national commission—or if the traditional commissions seek to re-expand, one might
expect them to broadly follow this blueprint.
4.3.2.2. Political toleration. The other fearsome ‘enemy’ of Canadian law
commissions, as revealed by the country’s experience described here, has
been ideology. Law reform commissions were premised on a conviction
that ‘ideology can be made subservient to knowledge’, so that reform was
best guided by independent experts. But in Canada, the repeated disbanding
of commissions by governments opposed to the political substance of their
reforms manifests a countervailing ‘desire to make knowledge subservient
to ideology’.264
The standard narrative further notes that often it has been politically liberal
governments that have created commissions and politically conservative governments that have closed them.265 But the story may be more complex than
that standard narrative seemingly implies. As mentioned, most commissions
grew up in the 1970s era of social liberalisation and cultural experimentation,
and their more ambitious, controversial and lay-visible reforms reﬂected
this.266 Meanwhile, being also the high point of welfarism, most commissions
261
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were government creatures.267 For observers from later periods looking back
from more conservative perspectives, the tendency would be to read these two
concomitant features together as one—hence interpretations of institutional
law reform as meaning taxpayer-funded ‘spend-thrift, left-wing social engineering’ with no democratic accountability.268 In other words, the noted hostility of political conservatism to institutional law reform may not properly be
to that notion itself, but rather a lingering impression from early high-visibility reforms shaped by the socio-economic contingencies of that era. In
this regard, Murphy notes that Canada’s ﬁrst national commission was
created with a ‘groundswell’ of all-party political support, whereas the creation of the second national commission—with the memory of the ﬁrst
being the most salient frame of reference—was ﬁercely opposed.269 Moreover,
Alberta, often seen as the seat of Canadian political conservatism, has the
longest continuously running law commission in the country. And the
next-longest running are those of the nation’s other two provinces typically
identiﬁed as politically conservative. Moreover, as eras changed, Macdonald
notes that the ﬁrst national commission also later came to be criticised
from the political left—as elitist, undemocratic, insuﬃciently critical, etc.270
What is certain is that the present age is one of sharp political partisanship,
if not of progressive polarisation. In that environment, future law commissions in Canada must be mindful of how often their predecessors, coming
into conﬂict with the ideology of their institutional underwriters, were executed ‘at the stroke of a pen’.271 The joint-venture model may delay that
threat, but as experts note, other stakeholders are unlikely to long support a
law reform commission in which the government shows no interest.272
Reform veterans agree that commissions must tread carefully,273 but the question is how to do that, given law reform’s political trilemma?
Burrows, comparing the Canadian experience to what he views as the more
stable and successful history in England, suggests that the answer may be for
Canadian commissions to likewise focus mostly on technical law reform,
rather than politically more fraught social policy reform.274 The lawyer’s
law reform he has in mind was also endorsed by Hurlburt, and such projects
have always been important to the success and survival of law reform commissions in Canada.275 But Québec’s successful codiﬁcation projects show how
far beyond lawyer’s law technical reform can reach. Though not a law
267
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reform commission (at least as meant here), the European Commission has
achieved immense reform amidst a multi-dimensional politically challenging
milieu by embracing—it seems to me—a technocratic posture, evident, for
instance, in its stated adherence to principles of ‘smart’ or ‘better’ Regulation.276 Its scope confounds common assumptions that technical reform
is limited, and social reform central (granted that no reform, including
black-letter, is without social and political implications).277 I might add that
this should not be surprising if we believe that the interests we share as
persons vastly outstrip the interests that divide us.
Overt social issue reform could still be undertaken. However, it should
probably be more rare, as indeed seems to be the policy of Canada’s surviving
commissions.278 It may also be best, as Glenn implies, that the ‘high risk’ work
of controversial projects be charged to special ad hoc committees, distinct
from the law commission, but under its broad supervision.279 Building on
Canada’s noted use and success with task forces and commissions of
inquiry, the upfront scope and term limitations of these substantially independent subcommissions for controversial social policy projects could mute reactionism, whilst the separateness of the relevant committee would ﬁrewall the
commission-at-large from ideological furore engulﬁng it and risking that it—
or the very notion of institutional law reform—be seen in political terms.280 In
this compartmentalising approach, there would be a price to pay in partial
segregation of controversial social policy projects from other law commission
projects, but a lesser price to pay than the institutional discontinuity of the
pattern thus far of general commissions repeatedly being shut down.
4.3.2.3. Institutional diﬀerentiation. Another pattern discussed here in the
picture of institutional law reform in Canada has been the elimination or
restriction of commissions based on a view that they are redundant and
unnecessary given the many other organisations engaged in law reform.
The involvement of special government committees, ministerial policy
units, ad hoc commissions and task forces, law societies, academics, advocacy
groups, activists, lobbyists, think tanks and consultancies, public legal education bodies and the citizens they reach, makes law reform indeed a
crowded ﬁeld. And with government captive to entrenched political parties,
in turn beholden to private power-networks, donors and opinion leaders,
all endemic to the ideological territory each party inhabits, the scope for
democratic altruism is limited by the imperatives of Public Choice political
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realities.281 In this context, it is unsurprising not only that law commissions
struggle to maintain government support, but that even with support, as Hurlburt, Burrows and Murphy all observe, commissions fare poorly in competing
for the attention of governments to examine and implement their
recommendations.282
As a result, a reorientation seems appropriate. Conceiving of law reform in
functional, rather than institutional terms, as the crowded ﬁeld counsels,
would enable perception of law reform not as the business of government
but as a problem of governance among the network of actors occupying the
ﬁeld.283 Within this reform network, commissions would wish to develop
strong collaborative working relationships with a plurality of other players
(such as ministries of justice, law societies, the academy and the umbrella
reform associations) on matters either common or complementary, as we
increasingly do see with the subsisting Canadian commissions.284 And commissions would aim to co-opt other subject-constituencies (such as citizens285
and aﬀected groups), as, for example, is evident through current commissions’
expanding consultation processes, yet controlling these interactions to
prevent particular groups from subverting public interest law reform into
special interest policy agendas.286 Within this law reform network, commissions as institutions speciﬁcally designed for and dedicated to the cause,
should be the hub, not a spare part for use when all else fails, as the OLRC
was constrained in later years.287 There is a need for reform leadership,
because in Pound’s words, ‘so long as this is everybody’s business, it is
nobody’s business’.288 Accordingly, ‘an expert law reform commission must
be arrogant as to its jurisdiction, but humble as to its authority’.289
If this is accepted as the framework for a commission’s labours, it becomes
evident why, as Macdonald argued contrary to the traditional approach to
institutional law reform, the commission’s work-product should not be
strictly or even primarily geared for government, but for the plurality of
actors in the network.290 Thus, possible outputs might include recommended
changes in law societies’ rules for the profession, briefs on important upcoming issues not yet before courts or administrative decision-makers, model
281
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standard contracts for practitioners, changes to the curricula by which law
schools inculcate tomorrow’s lawyers, tracts for incorporation in legal textbooks or a code of ethics for a corporate social responsibility standardsetting agency.291 It could comprise advice to citizens that changes citizens’
daily practices, such as: courses of action for dispute resolution, thus directly
reforming law on the ground; or changing customs or behaviour incorporated
into social context-based legal standards such as reasonable conduct, thus
indirectly reforming oﬃcial law.292
Though untraditional, the beginnings of this reorientation too, we can see a
trend towards in Canadian commissions. For example, the LCO may provide
recommendations to government, quasi-government agencies or the private
sector. Its vulnerability frameworks were for broad use, and its violenceagainst-women modules for law schools.293 Lastly, these suggested re-conceptions would require measuring success by broader means than the conversion rate of draft statutes into enactments.294
4.3.2.4. Autonomous adaptability. Immanent in the prior issues discussed,
institutional law reform in Canada has been confronted with the broader challenge of adapting itself to changes in the external conditions within which
commissions work. Changes in prevailing views in politics and political
economy, for instance, contributed to the demise of many commissions,
and later to the rebirth of some on a multi-stakeholder model more
synched with newer views and more resistant to other potential adversity.
But social changes continue; it is trite but true to say that change is the
only constant. Moreover, the scope and pace of change are now increasing
due to the compounding eﬀect of cumulative technological advancements.
Law commissions are already stretching traditional activities to accommodate
phenomena such as the transformation of information technology towards
new media platforms which may be non-expository, non-verbal, reductionist,
hyper-reactive, ephemeral, etc. How will commissions deal with even more
transformative comings, such as advanced artiﬁcial intelligence, brain-computer interfacing or regularly-occurring yet unpredictably-unfolding climate
change-induced public emergencies? To avoid the upheaval of the past, institutional law reform in Canada needs a capacity for self-reform.295
An increased support role for academia in institutional law reform might
help facilitate the development of this capacity. Antonio Lamer, former Chief
Justice of Canada and former president of the LRCC, opined that academics
were needed to address the big-picture questions—which in Macdonald’s view
291
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might reach as far as evolving ideas of what we understand by ‘law’, ‘reform’
and ‘commission’.296 Already, we see in the multi-stakeholder commissions
the inclusion of law faculties as integral elements of their institutional
support, as well as mandates that encompass legal research at a level
removed from immediate law reforms. However, it cannot be overlooked
that academia is a social institution that might well itself constitute an appropriate and highly relevant subject for law reform.297 To overcome this Catch22, broad consultations can help expose researchers and reformers to new,
diverse and challenging perspectives.298 This practice too, is one we see
now expanding in scope and format among the subsisting Canadian commissions. Combined with feedback taken from the work, results, internal reﬂections, advisory committees and sharing among commissions, there exists a
variety of reﬂexive inputs capable of enabling meaningful continuous reassessment of law reform’s aims, structures, methods, outputs and success
metrics. As the internal centre for this process of continuous self-assessment
and reform, the research arm of a law commission should also revolve in its
composition, in terms of both speciﬁc members and of backgrounds, in order
to avoid intellectual capture.299 This research should be clearly distinguished
from speciﬁc law reform projects, to achieve greater internal independence in
the self-assessment process, as well as to avoid external confusion as to the
nature of the institution, as hurt the LCC. Despite its many evident challenges,
the continuous law reform project of reﬂexive law reform reform is possible,
and perhaps indispensable, to the future of eﬀective institutional law reform in
Canada.

5. Conclusion
The story of institutional law reform in Canada has much in common with,
and some diﬀerences from, that in other countries. In Québec civil law, the
work of codiﬁcation commissions has been central, both in the resources
devoted to them, and in the work’s importance within the overall body of
legal reform. In the common law jurisdictions of the other provinces and
the federal government, the 1960s–70s saw a wave of commissions created,
of which many were since decommissioned, but a few recommissioned in
altered forms. Given the history, the risk of being defunded is an everpresent concern, which the commissions of Alberta, British Columbia and
Ontario are notable for having adopted a model more resistant to: a joint
venture among government and key stakeholders of the legal community.
All commissions have small budgets, and must rely on passion and ingenuity
296

ibid; Murphy, LRAs (n19) 50.
Macdonald, Dummies (n2) 885.
298
ibid at 883–887; Opeskin & Weisbrot (n32) 148–60.
299
Macdonald, Recommissioning (n19) 870–71.
297

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION

261

to make the most of their limited resources. The future can be expected to
present similar challenges, as well as new and unexpected ones. But if there
is any type of institution which should now by nature and experience be
able to reform its structure, processes, objectives or outputs so as to
respond to any reasonable exigency, perhaps it would be the diversely-constituted, tribulation-tested, lean and nimble Canadian law reform
commission.300
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